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Педагогическое учение Иммануила Канта в свете его философской антропологии

Введение. Гуманистическое понимание целей и задач воспитания и образования предполагает целесообразность и плодотворность основополагающей идеи всестороннего и гармонического развития человека. На первый план здесь выходят задача формирования личности, а не просто передача обучаемому индивиду определенной суммы знаний и навыков.

Одним из основоположников такого подхода в воспитании и образовании является Иммануил Кант (1724–1804 гг.), что делает актуальным анализ его философско-педагогических воззрений. Объектом изучения в статье выступает созданная им критическая философия в единстве с другими частями его системы, а предметом – его педагогическое наследие. Целью работы является анализ основных положений концепции воспитания и образования Канта в свете разработанного им проекта философской антропологии, определение взаимосвязи его педагогики и антропологии.

Материалы и методы. Общими основаниями исследования послужили метод философско-антропологической реконструкции и метод содержательно-смысловой интерпретации, посредством которых осуществлялся анализ педагогики немецкого мыслителя. В работе также использовались метод моделирования и метод восхождения от абстрактного к конкретному.

Результаты исследования. Педагогическое учение Кант создал на основе учения о человеке, сущность которого заключается в разуме. Обоснование необходимости воспитания и образования философ усматривал в морали. Целью развития общества является нравственное совершенствование человечества на основе развития в личности данных от природы способностей. Обучение относится к физическому воспитанию и предполагает развитие телесных свойств и душевных способностей индивидов; оно направлено на получение знаний, формирование навыков и приобретение умений. Образование же относится к практическому воспитанию; оно направлено на развитие нравственности и духовного мира личности.

Главной целью воспитания немецкий мыслитель считал образование личности как разумно мыслящего и свободно действующего члена социума. Поэтому воспитание вместе с попечением и дисциплиной включает в себя образование и обучение. Задачей школьно-механического образования является приобретение полезных для жизни умений, задачей прагматического образования – достижение разумности, задачей морального образования – формирование нравственности.

Заключение. Содержащийся в трех «Критиках» идеал «образовательного человека», как всесторонней и гармонической моральной личности, основан на его понимании как существа разумного, свободного и творческого. Разработанные Кантом программы трансцендентальной антропологии, моральной антропологии и эмпирической антропологии были реализованы им в концептуальных моделях физиологического человечоведения (исследование того, что делает из человека природа) и прагматического человечоведения (исследование того, что он, как свободное существо, делает из себя сам), которые представляют собой ступени на пути построения целостного учения о человеке. Но философская антропология кенигсбергского ученого – не «конкретное человечоведение», а, скорее, его замысел, проект, где учение о воспитании и образовании в индивидуальном развитии и в ходе общественной истории служит основой содержательного знания о человеке, как обладающего разумом представителю рода homo sapiens.

Ключевые слова: Иммануил Кант, педагогика, трансцендентализм, теоретический разум, практический разум, моральность, человек, личность, воспитание, обучение, образование, философская антропология

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Introduction. The humanistic understanding of the goals and objectives of upbringing and education presupposes the expediency and fruitfulness of the fundamental idea of the comprehensive and harmonious development of human. The task of forming a personality comes to the fore here, and not just transferring a certain amount of knowledge and skills to a student.

One of the founders of this approach in upbringing and education is Immanuel Kant (1724–1824), which makes the analysis of his philosophical and pedagogical views relevant. The object of study in the article is the critical philosophy he created in unity with other parts of his system, and the subject is his pedagogical legacy. The purpose of the work is to analyze the main provisions of the concept of upbringing and education of Kant in the light of the project of philosophical anthropology developed by him, to determine the relationship between his pedagogy and anthropology.

Materials and methods. The general basis of the study was the method of philosophical and anthropological reconstruction and the method of content-semantic interpretation, through which the analysis of the pedagogy of the German thinker was carried out. The work also used the modeling method and the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete.

Research results. Kant created pedagogical doctrine on the basis of the doctrine of human, the essence of which lies in the reason. The philosopher saw the rationale for the need for upbringing and education in morality. The goal of the development of society is the moral improvement of mankind on the basis of the development of abilities given by nature in the individual. Schooling refers to physical upbringing and involves the development of bodily properties and mental abilities of individuals; it is aimed at acquiring knowledge, developing skills and acquiring skills. Education refers to practical upbringing; it is aimed at the development of morality and the spiritual world of the individual.

The main goal of upbringing is the formation of a person as a rationally thinking and freely acting member of society. Therefore, upbringing, together with care and discipline, includes education and training. The task of school-mechanical education is the acquisition of skills useful for life, the task of pragmatic education is the achievement of rationality, the task of moral education is the formation of morality.

Conclusion. Contained in the three “Critiques”, the ideal of “educational human”, as a comprehensive and harmonious moral personality, is based on his understanding as a rational, free and creative being. The programs of transcendental anthropology, moral anthropology and empirical anthropology developed by Kant were implemented by him in the conceptual models of “physiological human science” (the study of what nature makes of a person) and “pragmatic human science” (the study of what he, as a free being, makes of himself), which are steps on the way to building a holistic doctrine of human.

But the philosophical anthropology of the Koenigsberg scientist is not a “concrete human science”, but rather his idea, a project where the doctrine of upbringing and education in individual development and in the course of social history serves as the basis for meaningful knowledge about a human as a representative of the genus Homo sapiens with reason.

Keywords: Immanuel Kant, pedagogy, transcendentalism, theoretical reason, practical reason, morality, human, personality, upbringing, training, education, philosophical anthropology

For Reference:
Introduction

For many centuries, thinkers have tried to answer the most important questions of pedagogy and practical philosophy: “What is upbringing and education?”, “What are their main goals?”, “What qualities should a well-mannered and educated person have?” Answers to them are possible only on the basis of philosophical anthropology with its main problem: “What is a person, what is his essence and purpose?”, without solving which it is impossible to create either a holistic philosophy of education or specific pedagogical theories.

The humanistic understanding of the goals and objectives of upbringing and education presupposes the expediency and fruitfulness of the fundamental idea of the comprehensive and harmonious development of man. The task of personality formation comes to the fore here, and not just the transfer of a certain amount of knowledge and skills to the student.

Humanism is a set of ideas and values, concepts and methods, material and spiritual practices that affirm the universal significance of the total existence of humanity and individuals, where a human is understood as a free being, a subject of knowledge, goal-setting and practice, based on his own reason and creative potential. In sociocultural terms, humanization is seen as a process of acquiring a person of his essence and achieving his destination.

Universal humanistic ideals find their expression in normative international documents on pedagogy. Thus, in the Incheon Declaration, which was adopted in May 2015 at the World Education Forum, UNESCO, as the United Nations specialized agency for education, was entrusted with directing and coordinating, together with partners, the implementation of the “Education 2030” Agenda. The “Education 2030” Framework for Action, adopted in November 2015, serves as a roadmap for achieving the ten humanistic goals in education, which aims to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote learning opportunities at throughout life for all” [24].

One of the founders of the humanistic approach in upbringing and education is Immanuel Kant (1724–1824), which makes the analysis of his philosophical and pedagogical views relevant. It is in pedagogical teaching that the anthropological, moral, legal, historical and cultural intentions of the great Koenigsberger are realized. The significance of these ideas is especially noticeable in the course of preparations for his tercentenary anniversary, which in our country is carried out in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin № 300 dated May 20, 2021.

We have to admit that at the beginning of the 20th century, the pedagogy of the German thinker, in particular, the educational theorizing and upbringing practices contained in it, has not yet received the recognition it deserves. (Thus, in the scientific literature there are sometimes ridiculous assertions that Kant has no concept of education at all, since he does not give teachers practical guidance in order to bring the student out of a state of immaturity or inferiority of moral qualities to the level of a more developed moral character [18, p. 331]).

This article aims to fill this gap to some extent. The object of study in it is the critical philosophy of Kant in unity with other parts of his system, and the subject is his pedagogical legacy. The aim of the article is to analyze the main provisions of the concept of upbringing and education of Kant in the light of the project of philosophical anthropology developed
by him, to determine the relationship between his pedagogy and anthropology, the role and significance of the doctrine of upbringing and education for the creation of a holistic and concrete human science.

The study of the situation in the philosophy of education of the Enlightenment not only allows a deeper understanding of the genesis of modern pedagogical discourse, but also confirms the relevance of the ideas of the founder of classical philosophical anthropology, their importance for the development of modern pedagogical science [3, p. 113–114].

Materials and methods

The materials for the study were the works of Kant himself and the works of prominent domestic and foreign researchers of his creation, in which the fundamentals of theoretical and practical philosophy, anthropology and the doctrine of the upbringing and education of the German thinker were considered. In the course of studying these problems, both philosophical methods and methods of the social sciences and the humanities were used. The general foundations of the study are the method of philosophical and anthropological reconstruction and the method of content-semantic interpretation, through which the analysis of Kant’s pedagogical teaching was carried out in conjunction with other components of his system.

The article also used: the modeling method, which consists in the creation and study of theoretical models that replace real objects, which makes it possible to reveal the fundamental connections and relationships between upbringing and education; the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete as the main method of the social sciences and humanities, based on the transition from abstract knowledge about a human to concrete knowledge about his upbringing and education in the course of theoretical reconstruction of the objects of study.

Research results

Kant created pedagogical doctrine on the basis of the project of philosophical anthropology developed by him, which is aimed at a holistic and concrete comprehension of human. This is a particular area of knowledge, a specific direction of philosophy and a unique method of understanding the existence of people. Therefore, the answer to the question about the way of upbringing and education, which is appropriate for humanity, depends on the answer to the logically preceding question about the nature of human as such [28, p. 339].

In modern thought, philosophical anthropology is understood, firstly, as one of the directions of post-non-classical thought, initiated by the works of Max Scheler and his followers; secondly, as a structural component of an integral system of philosophical knowledge, existing along with other philosophical sciences; thirdly, as an integral basis of all social and humanitarian knowledge, on the basis of which it is possible to explain the most important problems of the sciences included in it.

In epistemology, Kant contrasted the a priori and a posteriori types of knowledge. The a posteriori is applied only within the boundaries of experience, while the a priori acts as a formal condition of empirical knowledge, constituting the very concept of experience. The activity of consciousness lies in the fact that by means of a priori forms there is an ordering
of the information delivered to us by experience. The Koenigsberg scientist called these forms of thinking “transcendental”.

In his transcendental anthropology, human for the first time began to be understood as an active, transforming, creative being, as a subject of cognition, goal-setting and activity. Recognizing man as a “citizen” of two worlds—the world of natural necessity and the world of moral freedom—the philosopher distinguished between anthropology in the “physiological” sense and anthropology in the “pragmatic” sense: the first one studies what, according to the laws of necessity, nature makes of a person, and the second one that, according to the laws of freedom, a person makes of himself [7, p. 351].

The identification and study of the realm of the human being is precisely the main pathos of Kant’s anthropological philosophy. A man is able to cognize phenomena, but his mind is not able to grasp that which “is” outside of experience—things in themselves. The “phenomenal” and “noumenal” worlds not only oppose each other, but also interact with each other. The contradictory nature of these principles determines the essence and all aspects of human activity. As a phenomenon, person has a tendency towards evil, as a thing-in-itself, person tends towards good.

The German thinker formulated three main questions of his doctrine of human: “1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What can I hope for?” [9, p. 1011]. Subsequently, he added a fourth question to them: “What is a human”, which he declared to be the main philosophical question: “The first question is answered by metaphysics, the second by morality, the third by religion and the fourth by anthropology. But in essence, all this could be reduced to anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last” [8, p. 332]. The most important task of philosophy is the knowledge of life, and the most important subject in the world to which this knowledge should be applied is a human, because he is the last goal for himself [7, p. 351]. In a separate individual, as an active and rational being, the properties of the entire human race are embodied.

Kant considered rationality to be the essence of human. As a subject endowed with the ability to think and striving for knowledge, a human has a theoretical reason. This is the reason, trying to establish the abilities and boundaries of human knowledge, to determine the principles of intellectual activity. The purpose of theoretical philosophy is to study the ability of knowledge on the basis of comprehending the laws of nature. In the “Critique of Pure Reason” (1781) and related works, Kant tried to identify the possibilities of theoretical reason and determine the scope of its cognitive application in solving his own problems. He sought to carry out a “critique of the ability of the purest reason”, which should be built as an introduction to the “critique of practical reason” [9, p. 38–39, 78–81].

In this formulation, the term “reason” denotes the totality of all cognitive abilities of a human as a transcendental subject. The subject here is understood not as an empirical individual, not as a specific person, but as a reasonable human as a representative of the genus Homo sapiens, abstracted from the sensual and irrational aspects of his being.

The most important question in the field of epistemology, which transcendental philosophy is called upon to answer, can be formulated as follows: “How is meaningful knowledge possible?” Or more precisely: “How is knowledge as such, in particular scientific knowledge, possible?” Classical transcendentalism sees its main task in this area in the explication of the conditions for the possibility of rational thinking on the process of cognition in general. Critical philosophy begins with the definition of the possibilities and limits of knowledge. Unlike dogmatic philosophy, it is a study of the abilities of the transcendental subject, the conditions and limits of their application.
As a subject endowed with will and striving for action, human has a practical reason. Since he simultaneously acts as a sensual and rational being, the question arises about the general principle that underlies all his actions. “Here the reason is concerned with the determining foundations of the will, and the will is the ability either to create objects that correspond to ideas, or at least to determine oneself in order to create them ... i.e. its causality” [10, p. 313]. Practical philosophy explores the ability to act on the basis of free will, since “the object of practical reason is action through freedom” [17, p. 129]. The morality of an act is manifested when it is performed with a clear and precise consciousness of the moral law, the fundamental principle of which is freedom.

When “pure reason” determines the will, which, embodied in the intentions and actions of people, functions as free will, then it becomes practical reason, establishing norms and rules of behavior through the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative contains the idea of a human as the highest value, as an end in itself, and thereby affirms the freedom and dignity of the personality: “...Act in such a way that you never treat humanity, both in your person and in the person of any the other, only as a means, but always at the same time as an end” [10, p. 169].

Kant defines rational thinking as a unique human characteristic that distinguishes humans from animals, and this characteristic gives each human being an inherent dignity and worth. Individuals must follow the universal moral law because they are human beings, since the violation of this law is the denial of what makes a person human. Thus, using his reason, a person asserts his humanity [20, p. 842].

Freedom as the basis of personal morality and the goal of social life is the key concept of all practical philosophy. This is transcendental, intelligible freedom as a capacity for absolute spontaneity, which is realized in the empirical world. The idea of free will is a condition for the realization of the categorical imperative; it is empirically proven by the fulfillment of moral norms. Consequently, the postulate of freedom has the function of a direct constitutive condition of the universal moral law [13, p. 8–9]. “The essence of morality, according to Kant, lies ... in the assertion that morality or the good can only be understood through inner freedom”, writes the English researcher M. Despland, “the core of humaneness or human dignity is freedom” [19, p. 132].

For Kant, freedom cannot be ensured only by the conditions of human existence in the social and political sphere. Such “external freedom” presupposes the attainment of “internal freedom” as a condition of its possibility. This requires the creation and application of a normative concept of upbringing and education, aimed at understanding and achieving the high calling of mankind [26, p. 343].

The pedagogical doctrine of Kant is an integral part of his practical philosophy. It is directly related to the ethical doctrine set forth in the “Critique of Practical Reason” (1784) and related works, which are based on two provisions: the idea of the unconditional intrinsic value of the human person and the idea of duty. Transcendental ethics is not directed at what is, but at what is due: it is autonomous and a priori, rationalistic and rigorous. This is where its anti-naturalism comes from: after all, as an object of the will, the moral good can actually come into conflict with the natural good as the object of personal desire.

Back in the eighties of the XVIII century, under the influence of the ideas of J.-J. Rousseau about the conditionality of morality by the natural foundations of people's lives, Kant began to speak out on pedagogical issues. This is evidenced by his “Two Articles Concerning “Philanthropin” (1776–1777). “...If that method of education, which is wisely derived
from nature itself, were to be universally applied,” he wrote, “we could in a short time see completely different people around us...” [5, p. 467].

Later in the works “The idea of a universal history in the world-civil plan” (1784), “On the inherent evil in human nature” (1792), “Religion within the limits of only reason” (1793), “Anthropology with a pragmatic point of view” (1798) and a number of letters, the Koenigsberg scientist summarized his reflections on the development of a person’s natural inclinations in individual education and general history. In 1776/1077, 1780, 1783/84 and 1786/1787. Kant gave lectures on pedagogy, the notes of which were collected and published by his student F.T. Rincom in the form of a treatise “On Pedagogy” (1803).

Kant considers pedagogical problems in connection with anthropological problems. Are people naturally good or evil? Neither the one nor the other, the philosopher answers, initially man is not a moral being; he becomes such only when he finds in himself the strength to follow the universal moral law and freely fulfill its precepts. Deviating from it, individuals are subject to vices, because they are under the influence of unlimited natural inclinations and instincts [8, p. 497].

But if a man is imperfect in his motives, how is it possible that he, through his own efforts, becomes a good being? A person can become such only by striving to become moral, the German thinker emphasizes, therefore, through self-coercion. Therefore, from an early age, children should be taught to obey the dictates of reason. The original savagery of individuals must be restrained because of their unbridled desire for freedom without any rules. In a civilized state, people develop and discipline their natural inclinations through culture, since the main purpose of a person is to get out of the state of nature and find freedom under laws.

So, Kant sees the rationale for the need for upbringing and education in morality itself, in the foundations of practical philosophy. The moral education of individuals should begin with the transformation of the way of thinking and with the affirmation of character, i.e. determination to do something right. In our soul there are initial moral inclinations, thanks to which we, as beings conditioned by natural needs, are able to rise to the understanding of the moral law. But although this universal law is given as an a priori principle of practical reason, its realization depends on the actions of particular individuals. The development of society presupposes the improvement by individuals of the abilities given to them by nature.

In the treatise “Religion within the limits of reason alone”, speaking of the inclinations of human, Kant mentions, firstly, the inclinations of animality as a living being; secondly, the makings of humanity as a living and intelligent being; thirdly, the makings of a person as a rational and free being, capable of being responsible for their actions [8, p. 96–98].

The makings of animality are common to people with all representatives of the animal world. These are the premises of selfishness, physical and mechanical, for which reason is not required. They are realized in the desire for self-preservation, attraction to the opposite sex and communication with other individuals. The makings of humanity are also the makings of selfishness, physical and comparative; they are peculiar exclusively to man and are expressed in the desire to achieve recognition of personal value from other people, not allowing them superiority over themselves. Their implementation requires intelligence.

When deviating from the goals of nature, these inclinations develop into vices. Thus, the inclinations of animality become vices of natural rudeness and can turn into bestial vices (gluttony, lust, wild lawlessness, etc.) or into a desire for superiority over other individuals (jealousy, rivalry, etc.). That is why they can be instilled with the greatest vices of open or
covert hostility against those whom people consider strangers to themselves. Unlike the vices caused by nature, they are the vices of culture, which, with excessive development, turn into diabolical vices (ungratefulness, envy, malevolence, etc.).

The inclinations of personality can be formed in an individual only under the influence of the universal moral law as the basis of free will. Unlike inclinations, conditioned by nature, it implies a striving for good. The development of the inclinations of the first type is carried out on the basis of instincts, reason is not required for their implementation; the inclinations of the second kind are carried out on the basis of practical reason, although in this case it is subordinated to other motives; and only the realization of the third kind of inclinations presupposes a direct connection with the imperatives of practical reason. “The moral imperative brings into action an unconditional seriousness, which neither technical nor pragmatic considerations can achieve, provides them with an immediate internal absolute value” [22, S. 110], writes the German researcher N. Hinske.

In the work “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View”, the founder of classical philosophical anthropology calls these three types of inclinations “technical (mechanical, associated with consciousness) inclinations (for using things), ...pragmatic (for the skillful use of other people for their own purpose) and moral inclinations ... (for actions according to the principle of freedom under laws in relation to oneself and others)” [7, p. 575]. Their implementation determines three forms of people’s practical activity: “skill”, “prudence” and “wisdom”.

According to Kant, the development of human inclinations is carried out in two ways: firstly, as the improvement of the personality; secondly, as the perfection of mankind. In the first case, the universal moral law manifests itself directly in individuals; in the second case, it operates through successive generations. This contributes to the solution of the main task of pedagogy – the proportional development of natural abilities and the disclosure of all the properties of people so that they fully realize their purpose. This is impossible for the individual, but as a whole the human race can and must achieve this.

In terms of his individual existence, the philosopher notes, a person becomes a human only through upbringing. He is the only being to be nurtured and can be nurtured by previously nurtured people. Consequently, upbringing itself is not only teaching, theory, but also skill, an art that is continuously improved in the course of history. “Therefore, education is the greatest problem and the most difficult task for a person...” [8, p. 450].

Kant’s understanding of education, in essence, comes down to two aspects – the education of character and the education of morality [25, p. 335]. Each generation, applying the knowledge and skills of previous generations, carries out such education that proportionally and expediently develops the abilities of a human and thereby contributes to the improvement of his nature.

Being closely connected with the educational process, pedagogy is also the science of the art of education. In this science, the Koenigsberg scientist singles out physical pedagogy and practical pedagogy. Physical education should develop in the child the makings of animality and partly also the makings of humanity; it includes, firstly, the improvement of bodily powers, and secondly, the improvement of mental faculties. Practical or moral education is designed to educate the child in such a way that he can become a freely thinking and acting being. It should develop in children the makings of personality on the basis of respect for the universal moral law.

Upbringing involves care (maintenance and care), discipline (restraint and order) and training (knowledge and skills). In the process of upbringing, a person goes through the
stages of an infant, pet and student. *Care* is expressed in the concern of the caregivers that the child does not use his natural abilities to the detriment of himself and others. *Discipline* contributes to the transition of the ward from the state of nature to the state of culture; it does not allow the child, under the influence of animal passions, to deviate from his human destiny. To discipline means to protect children from the fact that their inherent animal propensity does not go to the detriment of their human qualities. Discipline subjects the educated to the laws of humanity and the norms of culture. Savagery is independence from all laws, moral and legal, and discipline presupposes its taming.

Speaking about upbringing, the German thinker always has in mind its ultimate goal – *the formation of a person and a citizen*. “To bring up means to educate a person, to educate a being who acts freely, can protect himself and become a member of society, has an intrinsic value ... in his own eyes” [8, p. 459]. Therefore, upbringing, together with care, discipline and training, is carried out in unity with education.

First of all, the child should be taught *obedience*. It is expressed in submission to the will of the leader, which is then realized as a reasonable and fair will. Obedience can be absolute, coming from coercion, and voluntary, coming from trust. The second kind of obedience is important, but the first one is also necessary, because it prepares the educated person to fulfill those rules and laws that he, as a future citizen, will be obliged to fulfill.

Obedience is also divided into the obedience of a child and the obedience of a youth. If the first consists in obedience to the requirements of the educator, then the second involves submission to the requirements of duty. (There is an “educational paradox” in this reasoning of Kant, which can be formulated as a question: “How to develop a sense of freedom in students, despite the restrictions on the part of educators?” It turns out that education itself serves as a limiting factor for students, since any the intervention of teachers is considered educational [27, p. 5]).

*Education*, the philosopher argues, contains two aspects: negative – discipline, which keeps from mistakes, and positive – training and leadership, which are related to culture. *To lead* is to indicate how to apply what one has learned. Therefore, there is a difference between a *mentor* who is only a teacher and an *educator* who serves as a leader. The first brings up for school, the second – for life.

In the initial period of upbringing, the pet must show submission and positive obedience; in the future, he is already allowed to use his reason and freedom, but under certain conditions. First, mechanical, and then moral submission dominates.

In this sense, education consists: firstly, of *school-mechanical education*, the purpose of which is the acquisition of *skills*, which is why it is of a didactic nature; secondly, from *pragmatic education*, the purpose of which is the achievement of *rationality*; thirdly, from *moral education*, the purpose of which is the formation of *morality*.

School education, or *schooling*, is the earliest and the very first. In the process of schooling, the student acquires *knowledge* and acquires *skills*. In the process of *pragmatic education*, the student acquires *rationality*, which in the future will allow him to become a citizen and receive social value. He learns to live in a civil society and enter into relations with other people in accordance with his intentions and goals. Therefore, the ability to apply one’s reason in an original and free way is the main direction of the development of human as animal rationalis. *Responsibility* serves as another direction, since in general a person cannot be reduced only to self-consciousness or his empirical being. Only in responsibility is revealed the personal dignity of each individual, his individual and unique self.
Feeling Kant does not oppose rational cognition and action, understanding it as self-consciousness, mediated by internal or external sensation, which everyone has only for himself. Sensuality, which is the subjective condition of freedom, is a transient state of the empirical subject, expressing pleasure (or displeasure), which is not only desire, but also pleasure [8, p. 184–185, 501–502].

In contrast to feeling, morality takes us beyond individual sensations into the realm of reason. The German thinker talks about the moral sense, through which a man perceives himself as a person, free from any sensual conditioning. First of all, this is respect, sanity and attention, where her self-consciousness is revealed, as personalitas moralis, i.e. a sense of respect for the universal moral law [14, p. 78–81]. In a moral sense, as a person's striving for his true being, the desire to receive only pleasure from life is overcome.

Thanks to moral education, the educated person acquires value from a universal human point of view. Moral self-consciousness, insofar as it is a priori inherent in the personality, manifests itself as the desire to be a rational being, and not just a being mediated by sensibility. Therefore, moral education, in so far as it is based on principles that a person must imbue himself, is the latest. But since it is based on the general human reason, moral education must be taken into account from the very beginning of upbringing.

So, Kant, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, distinguishes between the concepts of “schooling” and “education”. Under schooling, he understands the formation of skills, the acquisition of knowledge and the acquisition of skills, and relates it to physical education, which includes the development of bodily strength and mental abilities, the formation of discipline. Education, on the other hand, concerns the formation of morality and the spiritual world of a person and refers to practical upbringing, in contrast to school education, or schooling, and pragmatic education. “We belong to the animal kingdom and become human only through education” [5, p. 467], writes the Koenigsberg thinker.

Kant considered practical or moral upbringing to be the highest level of education. It differs from physical upbringing in that the latter has in mind only nature, and the former only freedom. Practical upbringing includes, firstly, skill, secondly, knowledge of the society and, thirdly, morality. With regard to skill, care must be taken to ensure that it is thorough, not superficial. Skill is a sign of talent. The knowledge of society consists in the art of applying skill to a particular person; it teaches how people can be used for certain purposes. Morality is about character. In order to cultivate a good character in a person, one must first free him from passions. The individual must become accustomed to managing his inclinations in such a way that they do not turn into passions that dominate his moral aspirations.

The most difficult thing in moral upbringing, says the philosopher, is the development of character. Character consists in a firm determination to want to do something, and then in the actual execution of the plan. To bring up a person’s character means to form a moral person who has the right ideas about good and evil.

Such education should begin with obedience as submission to the absolute will of the educator, which is recognized as reasonable and fair. Another character trait that should be developed in young people is truthfulness, since blaming liars contributes to one of the goals of education – honesty. And finally, the third character trait that deserves the attention of teachers is sociability. The formation of this character trait of children should be carried out under the supervision of adults, since it is designed to prepare the younger generation for an independent civil life in society.

In order to develop a moral character in a child, he should be introduced to duties towards himself and duties towards other people. Person’s first duty to himself is to possess...
a certain inner dignity. In relations with others, children should develop in advance respect and respect for the dignity, rights and freedoms of people.

But with whom should this kind of education begin, with rulers or subjects, with people in power, or with ordinary citizens? After all, the rulers for the most part care only about themselves and do not seek to take part in the improvement of the people they rule, because they look at them as a means to their own ends. The German thinker gives a clear answer to this question: from the initiative of the individuals themselves as members of society. Every culture begins with private enterprise that contributes to the common good, and people who are able to understand the idea of a better social order, and only then spreads further.

“When Kant used the metaphor “education”, he had in mind ... the progressive concept of education of the 18th century, which aimed at developing the abilities of the people and highlighting the autonomy of the individual and virtuous activity” [19, p. 264]. The philosopher mastered the humanistic ideals of the culture of the New Age – the autonomy of the individual, critical thinking and faith in the universal human reason (the provisions of which are a priori obvious to each individual), the spirit of which he expressed as follows: “Enlightenment is a person’s exit from the state of his immaturity ... which is not a lack of reason, but a lack of determination and courage to use it without guidance from someone else. <...> For this enlightenment, only freedom is required ... to use one’s own mind in public” [7, p. 27; 29].

In Western Europe in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, it was widely believed that upbringing and education make people better, happier and freer. At that time, the concepts of upbringing and education were used in a broader sense than in modern conditions, and were not limited to teaching the sciences and schoolwork. It was about the ability to think independently and the development of such a person who can have a beneficial effect on the life of society. The highest goal was declared to be “the formation of citizens” and “the formation of a person” for a full-fledged civilian life, which required knowledge of its essence and purpose.

Thus, in critical philosophy, the doctrine of upbringing and education is conditioned by a holistic knowledge of a human. But how did Kant understand anthropology, and what place did he assign to pedagogy in this knowledge? In his works, anthropology, as a systematically stated doctrine of the generic characteristics of earthly creatures endowed with reason [7, p. 351], presented from several angles [14, p. 277–288].

First of all, as shown above, the German thinker developed a program of transcendental anthropology. It does not deal with a human in the fullness of theoretical and practical, rational and rational and sensual, socio-cultural and natural-individual connections and relations with the world, but only with his refined and sacralized essence in the form of a kind of “transcendental subject”, in which active intentions are reduced to the realization of an a priori given categorical imperative.

The subject acts here as the focus of abilities, on the basis of which the whole system of activities unfolds. The form of activity, taken from the side of subjective parameters and abstracted from objective characteristics, is a human ability. In fact, there is nothing but abilities in the subject (in any case, we cannot know anything about this), since a human outside phenomena is understood as a thing in itself. But the abilities of individuals are not the “causes” of activity, since they do not contain substratum characteristics and are not “parts” of the soul.
In other words, the concept of abilities accumulates a set of those qualities of the subject that are realized by him in his activity and make a person the subject of this particular type of activity. Abilities are the methods of activity used by people as “technologies”. They do not have a single logical basis and cannot be reduced to a common ability or reduced to each other [14, p. 213–216]. This means that the concrete content of abilities can be formed depending on the goals and objectives of the educational process.

The subject of study in the three “Critiques” are the three highest abilities of a human as a transcendental subject: “pure mind”, as the ability of cognition, “pure reason”, as the ability of volition, “pure ability of judgment”, as the unity of cognitive (sensual) and goal-setting (moral) activities. Kant emphasizes that “pure ability” is an a priori form of activity emanating from the subject, devoid of material, content of activity, i.e. everything empirical.

In connection with empirical material, each operation carried out by people is assumed to have a corresponding ability. So, in the mind, as the ability to know, there are intellectual abilities of grasping, connecting, abstracting, designating, thinking, etc. [11, p. 124–125, 140–145, 884–887, 940–945, 948–951]; in the reason, as the ability of will, there is the ability of desire [10, p. 324–331]; and the general ability of judgment presupposes specific abilities – defining and reflective – as well as logical and moral, aesthetic and teleological, technical and sensual (pleasure and displeasure) and other abilities [11, p. 588–591, 864–873, 946–951].

Here Kant came close to the study of the phenomenon that in modern pedagogy is called competencies. (The competency-based approach focuses participants in educational activities on the transfer or acquisition of skills and abilities, and not only on communicating to students a certain amount of knowledge [4, p. 80–96; 12, p. 12–19; 15, p. 113–119; 16, p. 102–105; 23, S. 27–29]).

If in the “Critique of Pure Reason” it is mainly about the totality of skills and abilities of cognitive activity, then in the “Critique of the Ability of Judgment” (1790) one of the main tasks is to study the integral system of abilities of a person as a subject. This implies not only familiarity with the mechanisms of analysis, synthesis, reflection, but also the ability to carry out goal-setting, planning, self-assessment of one’s activities, and enter into productive communication with other representatives of the human community. (In this regard, it is characteristic that the philosopher defines the forces of the subject as his abilities for activity in order to create objects of his activity [11, p. 294–297]).

Kant also formulated the program of moral anthropology as a doctrine “about subjective obstructive and favorable conditions for the fulfillment of the laws of the metaphysics of morals in human nature” [6, p. 124]. It is impossible to do without moral anthropology, since it is on its basis that upbringing, training and education should be built. But this anthropological doctrine is also not purely philosophical, since, along with a priori knowledge, it contains judgments and prescriptions based on experience. Consequently, moral anthropology cannot be a guide in judgment or a discipline of the spirit in the performance of a moral duty, the unconditional prescriptions of which can only be given by “pure reason”.

Along with this, the Koenigsberg scientist singled out empirical anthropology, which arises only from experimental knowledge and is designed to explore how a person appears in a phenomenon, in space and time, i.e. as a corporeal-sense being. This “physiological human science” has as its object the special human nature, which can only be known a posteriori, i.e. from experience [6, p. 124, 341]. It includes age, gender, characterological, racial differences of people, as well as psychological and historical and cultural parameters.
of their existence, which in modern science study “physical anthropology”, “cultural anthropology”, “historical anthropology” and other sections of social and humanitarian knowledge. If “physiological human science” is the study of what nature makes of a person, then “pragmatic human science” is the study of what he, as a freely acting being, does or can and should do of himself [7, p. 351].

Since purely philosophical knowledge is derived from a priori principles, which are inherent in the properties of necessity and universality, the empirical doctrine of man, Kant believed, cannot be a holistic human science. But this is a step forward on the path of building a philosophical anthropology that combines a priori and empirical knowledge about man as a rational being, a representative of the genus Homo sapiens.

**The discussion of the results**

We agree with the opinion of M. Buber that in philosophical anthropology a human is given himself as a subject of research [1, p. 163]. But the Jerusalem thinker presented the formation of transcendental anthropology as the creation of a holistic and concrete human science in the context of “philosophy in the world-civil plan”, which clearly does not agree with the provisions of Kant’s later works. To the extent that history “according to the plan of nature” unfolds within itself, the Koenigsberg scientist emphasized, it realizes the “ultimate goals of nature”, and not the “ultimate goals of freedom”, which are characteristic of the moral aspirations of human. The world-civil state of society is the realization of the problems of the philosophy of history in the context of “physico-theology”.

Yu.V. Perov is right, who draws attention to another version of Kant’s consideration of history in a philosophical perspective – ethico-teleology. This is not about manifestations (objectifications) of freedom “in nature”, but about history “out of freedom itself”; not about the “ultimate goals of nature” itself, but about the “ultimate goals” of the moral improvement of humanity that are supposed outside of nature [14, p. 273–275]. Achieving these goals is possible only on the basis of a systematic study of the essential generic properties of people as rational beings, i.e. in the creation of a holistic philosophy of human.

In this sense, philosophical anthropology is the doctrine of the essence and purpose of human. But such a definition is too abstract, since it does not reflect the difference between anthropology as a special philosophical discipline and the doctrine of human on the whole. After all, the study of the nature and purpose of people, rightly notes M. Heidegger, is not the only task of this philosophical science. Its other task is to develop such a methodology, where a human is the starting point or goal of the study [21, S. 211].

In our opinion, the key to understanding Kant’s great intention to create a philosophical anthropology lies in his concept of upbringing and education. Pedagogical teaching is an important milestone in the ideological evolution of the great Koenigsberger from reasoning about the transcendental subject to the development of “concrete human science”. But to complete this work, it was necessary to overcome the narrow framework of transcendentalism and present a human in the unity of rational and non-rational, sensual and rational, generic and individual aspects of his being, which transcendental idealism could not do. This is evidenced by the interpretation by the German thinker of the main task of pedagogy: “... Children must be brought up ... for the idea of humanity and in accordance with its general purpose” [8, p. 451].
Conclusions

The pedagogical teaching of Kant is directly connected with his ethical teaching and is an integral part of practical philosophy. The ideal of a comprehensive and harmonious moral personality developed in the three “Critiques” is based on the understanding of human as a rational being and, in his potentialities, a free and creative being. But Kant’s philosophical anthropology is not a “concrete human science”, but rather an idea, a project of such a doctrine. Its implementation in classical thought in a logical sense involves the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, from the transcendental to the empirical, to their unity, where the doctrine of upbringing and education in individual development and in the historical process of successive generations of people occupies a central place and serves as the basis for building holistic philosophy of human.

Kant’s transcendental anthropology is an expression of critical rationalism, which did not pay due attention to the emotional-sensual sphere of people’s lives. This limited understanding was overcome by post-non-classical thought. Thus, the founder of modern philosophical anthropology, Max Scheler, created his doctrine of human based on essential phenomenology and theonomic axiology. The new approach he developed in the philosophy of education makes it possible to explore not only rational and rational phenomena, but also the emotional and spiritual intentions of a person, the value-evaluative aspects of his being [2, p. 14–16].

Kant’s brilliant ideas had a great influence on the subsequent development of philosophical and pedagogical thought. Their humanistic orientation has penetrated into all forms of social consciousness and culture.

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